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Abstract
How can we explain the complexities of Upendra Baxi’s lifework? He is commit-
ted to activism yet is attached to complex theorising; he is committed to the Global 
South yet has a deep engagement with Northern thinking; he makes a trenchant cri-
tique of human rights and law while asserting the importance of human rights and 
the rule of law; he is committed to human social justice while asserting the impor-
tance of climate justice. This article explores Baxi’s approach to the relationship 
between activism and theory, to constitutionalism and the rule of law, to human 
rights and to climate justice and suggests that any perplexity is resolved through his 
commitment to giving voice to and alleviating the plight of the impoverished, the 
disempowered, the suffering, and the rightless in his native India and elsewhere.
Keywords Upendra Baxi · Voices of suffering · Activism and theory · 
Constitutionalism · Rule of law · Human rights · Climate justice
1 Introduction
Upendra Baxi’s lifework is impressive in its enormity, complexity, and perplexity. 
The perplexity arises from the combination of his lifelong history of activism and 
belief in the necessity of complex theoretical analysis; his commitment to the global 
South combined with a deep engagement with Northern thinking, and his critique 
of human rights and law together with the assertion of the importance of human 
rights and the rule of law. This perplexity is resolved through his commitment to 
alleviating the plight of the impoverished, the disempowered, the suffering, and the 
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rightless in his native India and elsewhere.1 Typically, he insists that we should write 
about impoverishment because poverty is not a natural state to which the global 
South succumbs through backwardness but rather the result of human agency, poli-
cies, structures, and institutions:
The trouble with the word “poverty” is that it is a passive word, suggesting a 
state of social affairs, which has to be confronted, as best they can, by state and 
society, and until then to be endured by those called “poor.” The words “pov-
erty” and “poor” normalize what should be centrally problematic.’ Impover-
ishment is not a natural state but a ‘dynamic process of public decision-making 
in which it is considered just, right and fair that some people may become or 
stay impoverished.2
His commitment to enabling voices of suffering to be heard has led him to inte-
grate the roles of activist, lawyer, theorist, and educator–someone Baran appropri-
ately described as an intellectual as opposed to an intellect worker.3 He describes an 
early example of his activism as ‘the only Boalt Hall Asian law student to go march-
ing in protest against the Vietnam War, always threatened by dire consequence of 
the termination of my student visa.’4 Later, as a law teacher at the University of Syd-
ney, he proposed a course on aboriginal rights, still a burning injustice in Australia. 
Faculty opposition broke the conspiracy of silence about aboriginal land rights that 
prevailed in most academic institutions by catalyzing students and progressive aca-
demics to initiate litigation that ultimately led to the course being included in the 
curriculum. Such experiences formed the backdrop to his activism upon his return to 
India through the renovation of Indian legal education and research and social action 
litigation: ‘we learned through hard and harsh everyday experience both the social 
fact that the law is already given and that it can be changed through some modes 
of contingent juristic struggles.’5 This engagement has continued at various levels, 
symbolized by his long-term involvement with the Bhopal catastrophe prompted by 
his intense exasperation with the failings of the legal system and the federal state.6
Baxi’s activist approach underpins his thinking about constitutionalism and the 
rule of law, human rights and climate justice and his commitment to hearing the 
voices of the suffering.
1 Upendra Baxi, Taking suffering seriously: Social action litigation in the Supreme Court of India, Third 
World legal STudieS, 107 (1985); Upendra Baxi, Voices Of Suffering And The Future Of Human Rights, 
8 TranSnaTional laW ConTemporary problemS 125 (1998).
2 upendra baxi, laW and poverTy: CriTiCal eSSayS, 6 (1988).
3 Paul Baran, The Commitment of The Intellectual, 13 The monThly revieW 1 (1961).
4 Upendra Baxi, Keynote Address at Law & Society Association Conference: ‘Old’ Law and the ’New’ 
Social Movements: Towards Future Histories of Recovering the ‘Law’s Ends? (2006).
5 Id.
6 upendra baxi & paul ThomaS, maSS diSaSTerS and mulTinaTional liabiliTy: The bhopal CaSe 
(1986); Upendra Baxi, The “Just War” for Profit and Power: The Bhopal Catastrophe and the Principle 
Of Double Effect, in reSponSibiliTy in World buSineSS: managing harmful Side-effeCTS of CorporaTe 
aCTiviTy, 175–201, (Lene Bomann-Larsen & Oddny Wiggen eds., 2004); Upendra Baxi, What Happens 
Next is Up to You: Human Rights at Risk in Dams and Development,’ 16 amer. u. inT’l l. J. 1507 
(2001).
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2  Nothing is more practical than a good theory
Baxi is strongly opposed to an activist position whose suggested motto may be ‘Suf-
fering humans of the world unite because you have nothing to lose but the chains of 
theory!’7 While he understands varieties of theory aversion (though is less sympa-
thetic to colleagues than to students) and is a severe critic of ivory tower theorizing 
as well as the pernicious use of theory to justify historical and contemporary forms of 
oppression; what Foucault terms totalitarian or ‘all-encompassing global’ theories, he 
is equally concerned about much ‘pragmatic’ activism that suffers from implicit theo-
ries which undermine the causes they seek to promote. Instead, he conceives theory as 
a contested space in which the critical thinker seeks to liberate subjugated knowledge 
in the service of the oppressed.8 Baxi is deeply critical of Northern theorizing that ori-
entalizes subaltern scholarship and theories that colonize and subjugate knowledge of 
the global South. As one of us (Abdul) has suggested in another context:
His work will give as much if not more credit to the Southern voices of Gan-
dhi, Ambedkar and Samir Amin, the feminist voices of Nussbaum, Haraway, 
Fraser and Spivak, as to the modern socialist voices of Gramsci and Marx, the 
postmodernity of Foucault and Derrida and the ancient voices of the Koran, 
Upanishad or St Paul.9
This may make him difficult to pigeonhole (a fact that probably tickles his mer-
curial side) but his last gaze on the voices of suffering provides a framework for 
intellectual liberation that resists the creation of geographical, intellectual ghettoes. 
In his view, the task of the activist intellectual becomes ‘(to) give language to pain, 
to experience the pain of the Other inside you, remains the task, always, of human 
rights narratology.’10 Translation is a central role of the intellectual and the teacher, 
who must take care to avoid problems of translating the voices of the subaltern 
raised by Gayatri Spivak.11 For Baxi, this can be ameliorated by sensitive activist 
engagement with the sufferers.12
As two of the many who have been mentored by him and greatly influenced by 
his thinking, we can testify to his insatiable curiosity, his knowledge of every critical 
social, political, economic, and legal theory of the past half century, his respect-
ful engagement with interlocutors with whom he differs, and his immense influence 
on generations of students around the world. His is a restless and tireless intellect, 
always interrogating and probing.
7 upendra baxi, human righTS in a poST-human World 10 (2009).
8 Id.
9 Abdul Paliwala, Editorial: Upen Baxi – A Celebration, 2007 lgd 1.
10 upendra baxi, The fuTure of human righTS, 90 (2006).
11 Gayatri Spivak, Righting Wrongs, SouTh aTlanTiC QuarTerly, 546, 563 (2004).
12 See Alexandru Cistelecan, Which Critique of Human Rights? Evaluating the post-colonialist and the 
post-Althusserian alternatives, 5 inT’l J. ZiZek STud. 1 (2011). Suggests that Baxi’s position is close to 
being anti-theory.
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3  Demosprudence: constitutionalism and the rule of law
Baxi believes the law is essential but not self-evident, and must, therefore, be ana-
lyzed, critiqued, problematized and engaged with to identify its potential and lim-
itations for alleviating suffering and rightlessness. Much of his thinking proceeds 
by identifying the contradictory, oxymoronic nature of law through his ironic and 
self-deprecating Baxi-morons. Thus he suggests that ‘State law provides ideologies, 
institutions, and structures which can be effectively used for domination as well as 
struggles against domination.’13 In a perspective reminiscent of E.P.Thompson, Baxi 
suggests that the rule of law is a key ideology that enables a distinction between state 
‘terror’ and ‘legitimate force’ and therefore provides a basis upon which to hold the 
state and other powerful entities accountable, albeit through laws commonly tilted 
against the interests of the powerless.14
Resistance to injustice through the law is necessary but insufficient and must be 
supplemented by alternative forms of legality in which he has engaged in such as 
the Peoples Tribunal movement.15 For Baxi, the law is far too important to be left to 
politicians, judges, lawyers and legal philosophers.16
He distinguishes between legisprudence (principles or theories of legislation 
above and beyond the contingency of politics), jurisprudence (concepts, principles, 
precepts, standards, doctrines, and maxims of law), and demosprudence (judicial 
review and civil power that enhances life in constitutional democracies), and argues 
that understanding their interconnections is essential in comprehending the nature 
and operation of law in late modern society.17 Baxi has discussed the role of demos-
prudence in activist movements and the development of judicial interpretation, but 
it is clear from much of his other work that the underlying issue is the role of demos 
or the citizenry in the development, construction and interpretation of the law and 
constitutions. He asserts that ‘Constitutions are not areas of practices of state power; 
they also provide registers of interpretative practices of active citizenry … (whose) 
protestant mode questions the production of constitutional meaning as narrative 
monopolies of the privileged few.’18
Baxi’s work includes extended disquisitions on the role of postcolonial constitu-
tions and the degree to which they are progressive and transformative or conserva-
tive and depoliticising, and jurisgenerative or jurispathic.19 Constitutions born in 
17 Baxi, supra note 18, at 6.
18 upendra baxi, ouTline of a Theory of praCTiCe of indian ConSTiTuTionaliSm, 93, 111 (2008).
19 Robert Cover describes jurisgenerative processes through which societies create and give meaning 
to the law through their particular nomos, something that always occurs under the shadow of violence. 
Cover argues that courts tend to be jurispathic when declaring state law and seek to foreclose alternative 
interpretations of the law. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Nar-
rative, 97 har. l. rev. 4, 4–68 (1983).
13 Upendra Baxi, Law Struggle and Change: An Agendum for Activists, 35:118 SoCial aCTion 120 
(1996).
14 Id. at 121; e.p. ThompSon, WhigS, and hunTerS: The origin of The blaCk aCTS (1977).
15 Jayan Nayar, A People’s Tribunal Against the Crime of Silence? - The Politics of Judgement and an 
Agenda for People’s Law, (2) LGD (2001).
16 Upendra Baxi, Demosprudence Versus Jurisprudence: The Indian Judicial Experience in the Context 
of Comparative Constitutional Studies, 3 maCQuarie l. J. 14 (2014).
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struggle invariably invoke transcendental neutrality and the promise of unity and 
equality under (the rule of) law–a tendency that underpins Baxi’s fear that the future 
history of Southern constitutionalism will be that of a technocratic depoliticisation. 
For example, he has explored the degree to which constitutions- particularly the 
Indian Constitution- are simultaneously frameworks of coercion and consent that are 
used to freeze legal contradictions.20 However, he argues that these contradictions 
are less important than the “insurgencies” that characterize life under constitutions 
because they designate the constituent power to make and remake such documents.21 
Baxi would undoubtedly regard the Indian Supreme Court’s decision to decriminal-
ize homosexuality as an example of demosprudence and the protection of rights 
through law and struggle.22
Baxi argues that constitutions can be read normatively, structurally, historically, 
and empirically. Drawing on the experiences of Brazil’s, India’s and post-apartheid 
South Africa’s constitutional histories, Baxi discusses the various ways in which 
constitutions may provide a bridge during postcolonial transitions, when post-liberal 
constitutions are brought within an ‘ethics of transformation’ through a process of 
‘constitutional insurgency’ by the multitudes described by Antonio Negri.23 Histori-
cally, constitutions are distillations of ‘state formative practices, which constitution-
alize the “foundational” as well as “reiterative” violence in the name of constitu-
tional legality.24 Materialist and structural readings view the transformative nature 
of constitutions as spaces of three-cornered mediation between ruling classes, states, 
and ruled classes regarding the fairness of the distribution of primary goods such 
as equality and liberty. Another structural interpretation of constitutions relates to 
how they create and facilitate governance machines. ‘Normative/philosophical read-
ings in contrast fully suggest that constitutional arrangements are normative ways 
of inventing and replenishing social cooperation as promoting a fair and equal dis-
tribution of liberty and equality as primary goods.25 In order to be transformative, a 
constitution must ‘re-organize both memory and forgetfulness.26
4  The politics of and for human rights
Baxi’s rootedness in the claims of suffering leads him to view the role of human 
rights theory as persuading everyone ‘that the human is that entity to which 
everyone owes duties of equal respect and full recognition of worth, regardless 
20 Upendra Baxi, Preliminary Note on Transformative Constitutionalism, in TranSformaTive ConSTiTu-
TionaliSm: Comparing The apex CourTS of braZil, india and SouTh afriCa 15 (Oscar Vilhena et al. eds. 
2013). anTonio negri, inSurgenCieS: ConSTiTuenT poWer and The modern STaTe (2009)
21 anTonio negri, inSurgenCieS: ConSTiTuenT poWer and The modern STaTe 
(2009); Upendra Baxi, Some Newly Emergent Geographies of Injustice: Boundaries and Borders in 
International Law, 23 ind. J. glob. legal STud. 1, 15–37.
22 Upendra Baxi, Naz: A Critique, 49 eCon & pol. Weekly 6, 8; Navtej Singh Johar & Ors v. Union of 
India; Writ Petition (Cri.) No. 76 of 2016 (Supreme Court of India).
23 negri, supra note 21, at 23.
24 Baxi, supra note 22, at 25.
25 Id.
26 Baxi, supra note 26, at 29.
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of sex, religion, race, residence and like features.’27 This theoretical approach 
results in an outline of the tasks of human rights activism in The Future of 
Human Rights (the book for which he is perhaps best known) as ‘making the 
state ethical, governance just, and power accountable.’ 28 For Baxi, human 
rights discourses are not abstractions but have material effects-indeed, one of his 
most significant contributions is the development of a materialist conception of 
human rights in marked contrast to the natural law influences on conventional 
Western approaches. Taking human rights seriously means taking suffering seri-
ously. His insistence that human rights are authored in struggle by the right-
less provides an essential counterweight to liberal assertions that human rights 
are inherent and inalienable; on the contrary, protecting human rights requires 
eternal vigilance against predatory sovereign states, transnational capital and 
oppression based on caste, gender, and religion and constant attempts to appro-
priate and usurp these rights. Histories of resistance belie top-down accounts of 
human rights and struggles against colonialism, slavery, apartheid, caste and for 
women’s votes. The emergence of postcolonial collective rights from the strug-
gles of and in developing countries such as the right to development has been 
championed by Baxi as manifestations of the optimism of the will over pessi-
mism of the intellect.29
He has roundly denounced the politics of human rights, through which particular, 
often self-serving conceptions of rights are imposed on the rightless, in contrast to 
the subaltern use of politics for human rights.30 In the former, human rights ‘become 
the pursuit of politics– even aggression and war– by other means’, whereas politics 
for human rights are ‘an alternative politics, seeking against the heavy odds of the 
histories of power, that order of progress which makes the state incrementally more 
ethical, governance progressively just, and power increasingly accountable’.31
Baxi insists that although human rights may have originated in the West, they are 
not owned by the West. If this were not so, the emergence of new rights would not 
be possible. This insight leads him to critique the old and stale debate on universal-
ism and cultural relativism reflected in the self-serving arguments of proponents of 
Asian values.32 For Baxi, ‘The “Universal” . . . are practices of resistance to power, 
which play a creationist role in the making of “contemporary” human rights’.33 His-
tory, culture and context shape struggles and politics for human rights but do not 
preclude people from different societies asserting their right to rights.34
Baxi’s affirmation of the rule of law leads him to emphasize the importance of 
the juridification of rights in order to provide people with legal remedies. His retort 
to Amartya Sen’s assertion that human rights, primarily social and economic rights, 
27 Baxi, supra note 9, at 22.
28 Baxi, supra note 12, at 21.
29 Baxi, supra note 9, at 4.
30 Baxi, supra note 12, at 80–86 and 152–156.
31 Baxi, supra note 12, at 57, 58.
32 See Yash Ghai, Human Rights and Asian Values, 40 J. indian l. inST. 1/ 4, 67–86 (1998).
33 Baxi, supra note 12, at 184.
34 Baxi, supra note 9 at 27. Here Baxi is reflecting on Hannah Arendt’s arguments in: hanna arendT, 
The originS of ToTaliTarianiSm (1994).
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may be regarded primarily as ethical demands35is that there is a substantial dif-
ference between ethics and law, and the rights must be justifiable if they are not 
to become little more than pending claims. ‘To say that human rights statements 
may be primarily regarded as ethical does not . . . Quite guide us to the different 
moral histories of values, visions, and virtues articulated by various world-historical 
constituencies’.36
Baxi’s writing on human rights reflects the varied influences of writers as diverse 
as B. R. Ambedkar, Hannah Arendt, Karl Marx, Friedrich Hegel, Giorgio Agam-
ben, Judith Butler, Wendy Brown, and Jacques Rancière. His engagement with these 
thinkers underpins his innovative distinction between modern and contemporary 
paradigms of human rights. The former contained in the 1948 Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and the two covenants that flowed from it.37 The latter are 
the rights of capital that he aptly describes as trade-related, market-friendly human 
rights (TRMFHR).38 Emerging from the bourgeois revolutions and Westphalian 
sovereignty, the modern human rights discourse is based upon the logic of exclu-
sion, whereas contemporary human rights function according to logics of inclusion 
with the consequence that ‘the contemporary paradigm inverts the inherent mod-
ernist relationship between human rights and human suffering’.39 A key difference 
between modern and contemporary human rights flows from the tension between 
rights that emerged under the colonial domination of the global North (modern), and 
rights authored by subaltern communities of struggle and resistance in the global 
South under varying conditions of neo-colonialism and postcolonialism (contempo-
rary). Baxi argues that modern human rights were impelled by an absolutist rather 
than a universalist logic. For him, absolutism signifies fixity and non-variability. 
On the other hand, contemporary human rights provide for existential development 
based on the principle of universalism under which ‘every human person or being 
is entitled to an order of rights because every other person or being is so entitled to 
it.40 Thus contemporary human rights are universal ‘precisely because they deny the 
absoluteness of any positioning of rights.41 Nevertheless, such universality does not 
descend into total relativism because human rights are grounded in the ‘universality 
of collective human aspiration to make power more accountable, governance pro-
gressively just and state incrementally more ethical.’42
As neoliberal globalization spread during the last quarter of the twentieth cen-
tury, hard-won rights-especially socio-economic rights were subordinated to the 
TRMFHR regime that seeks:
36 Baxi, supra note 9, at 48.
37   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 
I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
38 Baxi, supra note 12, at 2, 258–264.
39 Baxi, supra note 12, at 42.
40 Baxi, supra note 12, at 185.
35 Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory Of Human Rights, 32 philoSophy & publiC affairS 4, 315–356 
(2004).
41 Id.
42 Id.
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to demote, even reverse, the notion that universal human rights are designated 
for the attainment of dignity and well-being of socially, economically and civi-
lizationally vulnerable peoples and communities. [It] insists upon the promo-
tion and the protection of the collective human rights of global capital, in ways 
which ‘justify’ corporate well-being and dignity even when it entails continu-
ing gross and flagrant violations of human rights of actually existing human 
beings and communities.43
There are apparent disparities between the languages and practices of human 
rights and governance in the two paradigms. Whereas the modern enunciation of 
human rights was almost ascetic, contemporary enunciations are carnivalesque 
and risk their commodification and proliferation by development and human rights 
industries dominated by legal and other technocrats, and thus in danger of becoming 
detached from the suffering and the needs of the poor and oppressed.
5  Climate justice in the Anthropocene
Baxi’s conception of human rights owes much to his analysis of the depredations of 
neoliberal globalization and the corruption and inequality that inevitably accompany 
it and sow the ground for the kind of authoritarianism, populism, and ethnonational-
ism exemplified by Trump and Modi. The myriad injustices of capitalism and uncon-
strained, unsustainable economic ‘development’ also inform his more recent thinking 
about climate justice in the Anthropocene. (In passing, one of Baxi’s virtues is his 
continuous engagement with contemporary problems and thinking, especially where 
these lead to harms and injustice). Climate change is a unique and unprecedented 
transboundary problem that affects everybody on Earth (albeit there are lifeboats for 
the rich) and poses new challenges for law and human rights, which cannot promote 
justice if they remain locked in the doxas and confines of Holocene rationality.44 Cli-
mate justice must be universally applicable to provide adequate answers for the suffer-
ing and injustices confronting humanity throughout this century and beyond. Climate 
justice is not possible so long as the human rights and justice claims of the poor and 
rightless-who are least responsible for creating the problem but most vulnerable to its 
harmful impacts-are ignored, and their rights violated. Realising the profound impact 
that climatic harms have on the poor, Baxi again demonstrates his ability to discern 
the nature of suffering and address changing legal, political and economic realities 
through theoretical critique to inform praxis.
Baxi’s focus on climate is relatively recent, but he has been concerned about 
environmental issues and the limits of the law for several decades.45 He has been 
outraged by the enduring injustices of the Bhopal tragedy-a prime example of envi-
ronmental injustice.46 Climate justice is intimately connected to environmental 
43 Baxi, supra note 12, at 234.
44 Upendra Baxi, Towards a Climate Change Justice Theory?, 7 J. h. r. env’T 1, 7–31 (2016).
45 J. bandhopadhyay, india’S environmenT: CriSeS and reSponSeS (1987).
46 Baxi, supra note 9.
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justice and cannot be achieved with reliance only on distributive, gender and global 
justice or new understandings of what it means to be human in a period in which the 
adequacy of existing theories are called into question. Baxi thus identifies the need 
to move beyond and to aggregate existing categories of justice in ways that must 
reflect the needs and interests of the vulnerable. As he writes, theories of environ-
mental justice have taught us that ‘more than the conventional notions of distributive 
justice are at stake here: one needs to add to the notion of justice also that of fair and 
equal participation of the impoverished and the indigenous peoples and concepts of 
fair procedural justice’.47
Anna Grear, a colleague with whom Baxi has closely collaborated, argues that 
Anthropos-the super-agent of the Anthropocene-is a narrow, self-interested figure 
that excludes most of humanity and all of nature. The Anthropocene, she writes, is a 
crisis of hierarchies and that:
Any ethically responsible future engagement with ‘anthropocentrism’ and with 
the ‘Anthropocene’ must explicitly engage with the oppressive hierarchical 
structure of the Anthropos itself—and should directly address its apotheosis in 
the corporate juridical subject that dominates the entire globalized order of the 
Anthropocene age.48
The Anthropocene is a useful concept that has moved beyond Earth system sci-
ence into the humanities, law, social science and public consciousness. It is, how-
ever, also problematic because it implicitly postulates undifferentiated humanity 
whose members are equally responsible for significant greenhouse gas emissions 
and climatic harms.49 Most of the individuals with the most significant historical 
responsibility for carbon dioxide emissions are the affluent residents of the North. 
The suffering caused by climate-related harms arises from the ‘industrial devel-
opment model and its metabolism concerning matter and energy, which altered 
the geopolitical trajectory of our Earth, is inseparable from the history of capital-
ist world-systems, of unequal ecological exchange, colonialism, and imperialism, 
exploitation, and underdevelopment.50
Baxi’s thinking about climate justice thus far has led to some provisional con-
clusions. First, climate injustices are related to but qualitatively and quantitatively 
different to other harms of modern industrialization. Climate change constitutes a 
unique and unprecedented threat to the human rights of the poor and vulnerable who 
are least responsible for causing the problem. Second, the telluric power of human-
ity in the Anthropocene generates profound ontological, epistemological, ethical, 
49 Dipesh Chakrabarty, The Climate of History: Four Theses, 35 CriTiCal inQuiry 221 (2009). We 
believe Baxi finds Chakrabarty’s speciesism and his failure to link the Anthropocene to underlying struc-
tures of social, environmental and climate exploitation such as colonialism and capitalism discomforting.
47 Baxi, supra note 46, at 18.
48 Anna Grear, Deconstructing Anthropos: A Critical Legal Reflection On “Anthropocentric” Law and 
Anthropocene “Humanity”, 26 laW and CriTiQue 3, 225 (2015).
50 Alf Hornborg, Zero-Sum World: Challenges In Conceptualizing Environmental Load Displacement 
And Ecologically Unequal Exchange In The World-System, 50 inT’l J. Comp. SoC. 3–4, 237–262 (2009); 
ChriSTophe bonneuil & Jean-bapTiSTe freSSoZ, The ShoCk of The anThropoCene: The earTh, hiSTory 
and uS, 228 (2016).
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philosophical, and legal challenges which cannot be met within existing discourses. 
For example, climate change challenges the linear teleology characteristic of Euro-
centric thinking. Should a theory of climate justice, Baxi asks, ‘engage the ontol-
ogy and epistemology of a free market and fragile neoliberal self or does it address 
a rather robust human rights self with powers to resist the total domination of the 
economy and the polity?’51 Third, a theory of climate justice must also address the 
historical challenges posed by past harms and the imperatives of intergenerational 
justice and, to a different degree, those posed by geographical injustices. Under-
standing climate (in)justice must flow, bottom-up, from the comprehension of the 
nature and causes of climatic harms and their impacts on the poor, rightless, and 
vulnerable. We are thus forced to think anew and ‘rethink the question of responsi-
bility.52 Fourth, a theory of climate justice must address the deep anthropocentrism 
of law, and the preponderance of natural and social science approaches to enable us 
to identify the nature and scope of obligations owed to other species and the planet. 
In order to do so, it is necessary to address the limitations in theories of global and 
environmental justice. Fifth:
Individual and collective human rights and our notions of moral responsibili-
ties and legal liability must be reinvented with a new perspective that respects 
[the principle of] ‘common but differentiated responsibility.53
Sixth and perhaps the most intractable problem of all is whether climate justice is 
possible under capitalism and the ‘anti-capitalist and anti-“system” politics’ required 
in pursuit of it?54
6  A brief synthesis
Baxi is a critical admirer of John Rawls’s theory of justice.55 The problems Rawls 
encountered in extending his idealist theory of justice beyond liberal democracies in 
the Law of Peoples,56 highlights the difficulties involved in developing a theory of 
climate justice that must necessarily be global and transboundary in an international 
legal system that remains resolutely sovereign-centric. Baxi’s overall perspective on 
climate justice reflects his general concern of the need to distinguish between epi-
sodic and structural change; the former merely alters the players whereas the latter 
changes the game. As he writes:
51 Baxi, supra note 46, at 13.
52 Baxi, supra note 46, at 11.
53 Baxi, supra note 46, at 20
54 Baxi, supra note 46, at 13.
55 Upendra Baxi, Some Notes on John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, inSTiTuT d’éTudeS avanCéeS de 
nanTeS, https://www.iea-nantes.fr/rtefiles/File/Ateliers/20140619-Huri/baxi-some-notes-on-John-Rawls-
lop.pdf.
56 John raWlS, The laW of peopleS: WiTh, The idea of publiC reaSon reviSiTed (2001).
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The problem of justice (and human rights) has always perplexed me; at one end 
of their struggle the perspectives of the masses of the impoverished, socially 
vulnerable and disposable peoples in the modern neoliberal world seek justice 
that is impossible now; at the other, they enact their struggles as if justice was 
realizable here and now and even in the circumstance of their choosing.57
This problem is part of the ‘aporia, or paradox, of justice,’58 Which include 
the tension between theories of justice and experiences of injustice, and the diffi-
culties involved in reconciling justice for current and future generations- which in 
turn raises questions about the relationship between theory and praxis that Baxi has 
grappled with throughout his career. As he observes, the problem of justice is the 
problem of the compossibility of the natural and the metaphysical, and of the past, 
present and future.59 His perspectives on constitutionalism, the rule of law, human 
rights and climate justice all attest to the need to place the voices of suffering fore-
most in the search for justice.
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